Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

6-1-1972

Agricultural Productivity and the Distribution of Land: Venezuelan
Case
James Hanson

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Hanson, James, "Agricultural Productivity and the Distribution of Land: Venezuelan Case" (1972).
Discussion Papers. 156.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/156

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE Ui':UVERS ITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 148

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND:
THE VENEZUELAN CASE

James Hanson

June 1972

Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimdate discussion and critical
commento Refer.~nces in publications to Discussion
Papers shou!.i be deared with the author to protect
the tentative ch~~acter of these papers.

Agricultural Productivity and the Distribution of Land;
The Venezuelan Case
Latin American economists and radicals never tire of pointing out
the impact of agrarian structure on the output and growth rate of the agri..
cultural sector.

They claim that the coexistence of "the latifundio" with

its satellite "minifundia" and the widespread prevalence of share cropping

and land occupation without title cause, not only a maldistribution of poli
tical power, but substantial economic misallocation.

Through their monop•

sonistic control of the land, water and timber rights, and their manipulation

of sharecrcpping and ~ental eontr~cts, the large landlord~ ean extract a sub•
stantial surplus from the peasants.

Moreover, the effect of this exercise

of power is to squeeze the peasants onto their own small plots, to which they
must devote too much labor in order to survive.

At the same time land on

the large farms is underutilized and often left completely idle.

While the peasant's ability to migrate to the city mitigates the
lanolord's power of exploitation, moving costs are certainly high.
the peon reaches the city the employment opportunities are poor.

And once
Moreover

the large landowners have often used a variety of legal means to restrict
workers 1 mobility such as police codes on vagrancy, army impressment for
service on lands, payments in kind or token money, debt peonage, and the
threat of military or police intervention by the overseer, who wae often the
local Chief of Police.

In many cases, the landowners have also tried to

1
prevent the development of feeder roads beyond their ot-m plentations.
Finally, high population growth rates and the large fraction of the pcpuletion
which remains on the land reduce the impact of the large (absolute) mistatiolla
2
which have been observed, leaving real rural wages roughly constant.

-2-

The net result of this agrarian structure is low productivity and
agricultural stagnation;

3

the radical solution to the problem is of course

a "cambio de estructura," a major land reform and restrictions on rental
sharecropping contracts.

If this occurs, then output will grow once and for

all through the correction of static misallocation,

4

and again as the former

tenants and minifundistas apply modern techniques which the latifundista
was to lazy to adopt.
Running counter to this argument is the conservative view that pro

perty gravitates to those who administer it best.

In other words, large

farmers have obtained their holdings because they were more efficient than
others and because they took advantage of technical improvements, such as
the greater productivity of modern inputs.

Being less tied to tradition

than the peasant, the large land owners quickly switched to the most pro
fitable crops and adopted new methods more rapidly.
were then used to buy more land.

The resulting profits

If this view is true, then land redistri

bution would lead to a substantial fall in output in the short run and a
slo"'ing of technical progress in agriculture-

This view is perhaps stated

most concisely in the Mexican proverb that to give a beggar a donkey is
simply a way of permitting him to ride to the devil. 5
Finally, there is an intermediate case, which we shall term "Market
Failure" based on the inability of market analysis to e]cplain observed
phenomena without reference to information and transactions costs.

For

example, one might take the view that the average productivity of a given
bundle of primary inputs--land, labor, and capital--is greater on large
farms because of their greater use of profitable intermediate inputs.

The

smaller farmer does not use these intermediate inputs to the same degree

because of transactions costs (e.g. the capital cost of a tractor may be too
great for a small plot, yet the transactions necessary to share one may pre•
vent farmers from combining to make the purchase.
Japanese tractors may reduce this problem.)

However, the new small

Alternatively there are addi•

tional information costs and risks involved when the small farmer adopts new
fertilizers, switches to new crops, and gets credits.

(On the other hand,

the small farmers' credit costs may be higher because of discrimination in
capital markets since in many cases the heads of the banks are the lati•
fundistas).

The remedy for low productivity and stagnant agriculture in

this intermediate case of market failure, provided that the large landl~ds
have not used their greater profits to buy up more land and obtain monopsony
power, 6 is not land reform but the improvement of various markets, perhaps
starting with government loans to small farm/ to take advantage of the

economics of pooling risks and with the

provision of technical information.

8

It should be obvious that in practice it is difficult to distinguish
which of these three views··-radical, conservative, or market failure--has
greater validity.

For example, if the lower use of intermediate inputs re

flects costs of information, then case 3 blends into case 2.

Further, lllisalloca•

tion in case 1 and case 3 refers only to underproduction of goods.

It is

quite possible that given the income distributionJ the utility provided by
✓

the combination of goods and risk produced and the satisfaction obtained

through discrimination in capital markets, in land ownership, or in work
on ones own land is maximized.

However, in either case 1 or 3 a land reform

which broke up large estates would increase agricultural output.J if intermediate inputs were held constant.

Finally, it is also possible that the

contracts which are made reflect factors which are difficult to measure such

'

•. -+ .

as risk and that there is neithe:::- static nor

dynamic misallocati on.

9

However, as is traditional in emi?irical research, we shall forge ahead by
ignoring these points.
It is also obvious that the 8ge old equity-effic iency argument is
tremendousl y relevant to the issue of land reform.

The redistribut ion of

income, wealth, and power which accompanies a major land reform has important
welfare aspects, and may be the maj':):-: argument for a land reform.

However,

we shall concentrate our efforts solely :!.:r. the im,estigatio n of the static
production aspects of land reform. lO

In particular our discussion will be

confined to the case of Venezuela, which by Latin American standards has a
relatively good set of data on t~e agricultura l sector.
In the next section of this paper, the Venezuelan pattern of land
tenure and distributio n of farms by size of holdin;:;s will be discussed.
Data presented there for the three census years (1936, 1950, 1961) will show
that the uneven distributio n of :::-ural lan•j which existed in Venezuela before
the agrarian reform of the sixties, ·wac certainly representat ive of the
11
,_
•
•
• A
genera 1 L a t in ~m?Yican pic~ure.

Further, at least in the aggregate, the

concentrati on of land ownership changed very little despite the efforts
at land refo::rn b8'.~:c,veen 19l:-5 and 19l~8 and the renewal of these efforts, to
gether with some occupation of latifundia in the late fifties
sixties.

12

and early

-')n the :-:-·::·· h;:md this would seem to reduce the danger that the

13 increasing
·
·
·
· d.isequi· 1 i· b r1.um,
. in
t rne.::1.t is
.
. . an d inves
s t rue t ure c f 1_,a-:::-d m-mership
confidence in the s·::--:1tistical eetimates of the production function.

Hm•1ever,

it would seera to preseI'.t some probl~::ns in ~he testing of the hypotheses
about the effects of uneven dist::ibutior . on output and growth, for a stable
ovmership st::-uctm:-2 !"'.l~ans it is difficult to separate the effect of o,;-mership
structure :'.:~:'.'::"1 ·::1e diffe::·P.c!:::"'f' in t.he average productivit y of states.

In Section 3 a~ricultural production functions are estimated for
Venezuela using ordinary least squares and the analysis of covariance
method.

Section 4 develops a heretofor unused test for static misalloca

tion and Section 5 applies it to the Venezuelan agricultural economy in
1950 and 1961.

Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the basic

findings, namely that the data seem to indicate that a substantial static
misallocation of land existed in 1961 and that the land reform, 'tvhich took
effect at that time, combined with the devaluation and improved markets
for intermediate inputs, probably explains most of the rapid growth of

Venezuelan agriculture during the sixties,

However, the major problem was

one of ownership structure not tenure conditions.

II.

Land Tenure ia Venezuela
The Venezuel2n a:::;ricultural economy would seem to be an excellent

ease for testing the rel2tive merits of the three hypotheses advanced earlier
(radical, conservative and market failure).

From the three Venezuelan agri•

cultural censi (1936, 1950, 1961) relatively good data on land tenure, farm
size and inputs can be obtained.

.As will be sho,vn below, the ownership of

land is very uneven in Venezuela but the aggregate structure of ownership
and tenure was relatively stable, at least until 1961.
Tables I and II summarize the available aggre3ate data on the per
centage distribution of total land by farm size and tenure classifications.
Each entry in Table I represents the percentage of land held under a certain
tenure arrangement (owne!.", renter) share cropper, squatter) on farms of a
certain size.

Thus, Table I, Col. 4, line 3 shows that in 1950 1. 5 percent

of the total land was held under proprietorship on farms of 5 to 20 ha,

Table I
Venezuela
Pe'l"_CE!_nt:a2 Distribution

.12.22

~roprietors

Number of Farms
l2tl>1--k
.12.2.Q

Farm· Size (ha)*

69,777

234,730-lri<*

320, 094-lrtt'

Under 5

24,673
25,932

125,990
69,565

10,353

26,023

160,234
99, 189
40, 167

5-20
. 20-100
100-500

4,182

500-1000
Over 1000

1,304
3,338

7,866
1,864
3,422 ·

.2! 1!!.!!!! !!illt!!M ~ X!!.!.!Jl ~
__.J!_enters

ill~

.!.2il

l21Q

97,598

125,627

35,633
•2

-

•5

1. 5

1. 6

.3

.3

3.0

3.3.

.4

.• 4

5.2

6.8

'5

.s

2,802

4.4

5.7

.2

.2

68. 7

-83.2

66.6

-84.5

15,223

14,954
.1

25,966
.1

13,479
. 4,223

Sharecropoers
.12.§l
.12.2.Q

1961

.lt,

~-.£1!2

and

•.1
•2

.2
•2
.2
.1

TOTAL
1950

1961

.3

1. 1

1. 3

1.0

2.8

3.5
6. C
10.5

Sguatters

-.1950

.12.22

.llil
124,119
•6

80,487
.4

1.4

•2

•8
1.0

2. 1

1,8

4.6

•1

1. 3

3. 1

4.0

7.3

0

•8

1. 1

3. 9

5. 5

7.0

89. 0

79.4

7L7

100. 0

100.0

100.0

.1.7

.7

1.4

0

6.9

4.4

3.3

2. 2

2.2

.6

11. 3

12. 7

--

Total land held

*
1rl<

-lc-k'lt

•

1936/7
1950 ·

23,370,503.0 ha
22, 126,640. 0 ha

1961

26,004,861.1 ha

source:

MAC Reforma Agraria, Caracas, 1959, _vol. II, p. 494.
DGE II Censo Agropecuario I, pp. 39-69.

----------...:.

------------.> -

.
DGE III Censo Agropecuario XIX, PP• 131, 157, 183.

'

I
01

Each class does not include farms of the last she.

1961 figure includes 4617 rural exploitations without land,•
In 1950, 6,058 exploitations with 795,367.3 ha (3,,6% of land) were operated beneath multiple forms of tenure.
In 1961, 24,542 exploitations with 1,370,729.6 hs1 (5.3% _of land) were operat~d beneath multiple forms of tenancy.
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Table II
Venezuela
Percentage Distribution of Cultivated
As a % of total
land
Farm Size
Under 5 ha

1950

1961

•9

• 9.

As a %, of own
land cultivated
1950
11§1.

As a% of total
land
11§1.

Tenure Class

82

69

Prop.

5-20

1. 6

1. 8

57

33

s. c. and Renters

20-100

1. 3

1. 4

28

23

Occupants

Over 100

2.1

2.3

2

Total

5.9

6.4

-5. 9

3
6.4

Total Cultivated Land
(Crops)
1936/7

730, 000. O ha

1950

1,302,116.0 ha

1961

1,669,351.4 ha

*Permanent and.transitory crops, excludes cultivated pastures.
Sources:

See Table 1.

~-,\o

Total

As a% of own
land cultivated
12.§l

3. 5

4

.8

29

2. 1

17

6.4

6.4
I
-..J

I

while col. 4, line 7 shows that 6807 percent was operated under proprietor•
ship on farms of over 1000 ha.

The column totals represent the total per-

centages of the land held under each class of tenure, eog., col. 4, line C

shows that proprietors held 83.2 percent of the land in 1950.

The row

totals represent land on farms of a certain size, e.g., farms between 5 and
20 ha in size held 1.0 percent of the land in 1936, 2.C percent in 1950
and 3.5 percent in 1961.
The most obvious point to be made from inspecting Table I is the ex
treme inequality of land holdings, which is characteristic of so many
1£'.:.
•
•
Latin .American countries.

This is especially true since much of the land

in the last three tenure categories probably belongs to the large owners.
Further, since farms held by different members of the same family and farms
which are not in the same "municipio" are both treated as separate exploita
tions, concentration of ownership, as opposed to operation, is probably even
higher than shown"

The data in Tble I also suggest a slight reduction in

size inequality over time, with the land being divided up into more me:lium
and smaller plots, and this is borne out by the Gini coefficients of concen
tration which were .925 in 1936, (strongly affected by the 89.0 percent in
farms of over 1000 has, and e}ccluding the lands of the dictator, Gomez),
• 9l~6 in 1950, and • 909 in 1%1, where 1 represents perfect inequality--every-

lS
·
.
b e 1ongs to one unit•··
.
an d 0 represents per f ect equa 1·i ty o f d'istrJ.'b ut1.on.
t h ing
l-Jhile progress has been made since 1936, the reduction in inequality has,
in fact, been slight in the decade before the land reform of 1960.
Table II shows that at least in 1950 and E'Gl the percentage of cul
tivated land was much higher on small farms, though the percentages declined
from 1950 to 1961.

On the smallest farms (under 5 ha) it was over

80

percent in 1950 and 70 percent in 1961 compared with around 25 percent in
the farms between 20 and 100 ha and less than 3 percent in the farms over
100 ha.

The prevalence of uncultivate d lands on large farms has been ob•

•
A. t11nerican
. most L atin
stu d'ies. 16
serve d in

Hm-1ever some, though not all, of

the differences in the percentages of cultivation are due to the fact that
many of the large farms are cattle ranches in the llanos, which are not very
useful for cultivation due to annual flooding.

With small and medium sized

farms cultivating so much of their available land, and large farms culti•
vating so little, we find that (a)

a very small percentage of land is cul•

tivated (5.9 percent in 1950, 6.l:. percent in 1%1), (b) that more than half
of the cultivated land is on the farms under 100 ha (M. percent in both 1950
and 1961) and (c)

the distributio n of cultivated land is more even than

that of total land, as shown by Gini coefficient s of • 505 in 1950 and • .SOl:.
in 1961.

Finally, we should note that although there has been some move•

ment toward a more equal distributio n of cultivated land, in the aggregate
the relative fractions of land cultivated on the different size £arms has

not changed much between 1950 and 1961.

This stability, as well as the xe•

lative stability of the various size and tenure classificati ons sholNtl in
Table I suggests that aggregate estimation of agricultura l production
functions is feasible, or at least more feasible than would be the case if
there had been signffieant changes in size distribution s and/or the structure

of land tenure.

However, the stability of land distributio n in each state••

the Gini coefficient s of total land holdings usually change less than tvJo
percent--wo uld seem to make it difficult to separate the effect of owner
ship structure from differences in the productivit y of each state.

•• .L (, •

The usual a;:;proach to testing the three conflicting hypotheses
(radical, conserva~~v e, market failure) about static misallocatio n and rates
of technical change would require data on individual farms.

Then production

functions, technical change, and marginal products of different factors on
the different farm sizes o:.· farms c--1.i.tivat::d under different tenure arrange
ments would be esti~:ated and co:nparedo

0£ ccu:tse there are many pitfalls

in this approach) such as the diffi~ulty of separating biased technical
progress and the elasticity of Sc:bstitutio: l,

17

Moreover, even assuming a simple

cross-sec~i onal Cobb Douglas function with neutral technical progress leads

to the well-knoi:,m s"'.:atistical p:oblems in :i.dentificat ion, owing to the prolG
. .
. . .
fit max1.m).z1.ng c:md1.t1.ons.

In ac-:dition, the usual estimates of the

variances of the msrginal products are biased, and so it is difficult to
construct confidence intervals

,,if.th which

'':O

test the equality of,

labor=s marginal product on, say, large and small farms.

19

Since Venezuela,

in common with most less developec! countries, lacks such cross-sectio nal
sample survey da::a, even this app.:~oach cannot be used.

20

As an alternative ,

an indirect estination procedure, using as observation s the state, district,
11

and even
be tried.

,nunici.pio" values of outpnt d::;·::a on oifferent sizes of farms might
Howev::;r, ,1hiJ.e statew:i.de data on outputs and most inputs is

available by si22 cf .fa:::1,'. a:id i.n ss':le cases by t.enure classes, even a

rough breakdown ::,f J. ubc::- '.:.Se or:. diffcre:1-;: size farms and farms operated under
ITonetheless , as will be described

different tenur2 class2s is ~navail2ble .

below, it is still possible-" to rr,ake sor~e tests of the static efficiency.
As a p:-elim::.na~::y to thes'.:. tests

.
.
f unctl.OU i:1

C~Op

21.
.
d
pro UC~l0~s

,-,e

estimate a statewide production

?:'., b•lgir.. let u

J

assume that the crop production

of each state is subject to an aggregate production function which differs
only in the constant term)

22

due to random, log normally distributed,

multiplicative, interstate differences in soil, rainfall, etc.

For the sake

of simplicity, the form is assumed to be Cobb Douglas or linear in the logs,
i.e.,

1]
where

(~

t

log

j

n

= ~1 P·1.

t
t
logX .. +u.

J

1.J

= gross value crop output) measured in E57 prices (Banco

Central de Venzuela, Memoria 1959, Caracas, 1961) in the j

th

state in year t

X~. = stock of the 1

th

l.J

P.1. =
t
J

u.

factor used in the j

output elasticity of the i

th

th

state in year t

factor

= the log of ~he random neutral·•multip licative difference in

efficiency in state j in year tc
distribution of u

t

It ,vas assumed that the

is normal with constant variance.

As an

alternative) to correct for heteroskedasti city, estimates
based on per farm data were tried.

However, they showed little

or no change in either the coefficients or standard errors of
the regression.
Only stock variables were available (except fertilizer which is a
flow) and it seemed that any attempt to derive a service flow
bias the estimatee in an unknown direction,.

23

would only

Further, by using the stocks

of inputs and assuming that in the aggregate producers maximize expected
outputs but are confronted with a random disturbance in any given year, we
24
. .
t.
. 1
h ope t ore d uce s1.mu taneous equa 1.on 01.as.

With the exception of the labor figures, all data from the study
have been taken from the sources listed in ~able I.

As

to labor, two

-12-

estimates of the labor force engaged in crop productio n in each state
during 1961 were used, one based on the 1950 populatio n census (applying
the 1950 ratios of crop to total agricultu ral workers to the figures for
agricultu ral workers shown in the 1961 populatio n census) and the other
based on the results of a BCV sample survey on the percentag e of hired time
25
.
d
k
.
spent on crop as oppose d to 1 ivestoc pro uction.

However there was

little differenc e in the two results and the paper presents only those
estimates based on the first method.
In an effort to reduce the problem of differenc es in land quality
only cultivate d land has been used.

Thus pasture land was omitted from

the independe nt variables and the value of livestock output from the depen
dent.

In addition, the observati ons for the Venezuela n states of Apure,

Nueva Esparta, and the Federal Territori es were not included since it was
felt that there were substanti al differenc es between the land quality in them
26
and in the rest of Venezuela .
Table III contains the results of Equation (1) estimated for lSSO,
1961, and for both years, using census data, together with the Standard
errors of the estimated coefficie nts-outpu t elasticit ies in parenthes es.
Coefficie nts which are significa ntly different from zero at the 95 percent
level are indicated with one asterisk, at the 90 percent level with two
asterisks .
In all these cases the sum of the coefficie nts is somewhat less
than one, though not significa ntly different from one at the 95 level as
shown by the F statistic s at the bottom of the table (These F statistic s
were calculate d from a compariso n of the unconstra ined and constrain ed
productio n function, where the constrain t was the requireme nt that the

-12a-

TABLE III

1950-1961
7.24* (. 66)

Constant

1950

.1961

6.85* (1.19)

7.38* (1.05)

.10 (. 07)

.10 ( .12)
.10 ( .10)

L Tract

.10* (. 05)

L Frtlz

-.07* (. 03)

-.09* (. 04)

L Irrig

.02 (. 04)

.02 (. 09)

-.09 (. 07)

-.04 ( .10)

-.08 ( .12)

L Lab

.10 (. 21)

-. 06 . (. 37)

.19 (. 48)

L Land

.72* ( .19)

.85* (. 30)

.67* (. 42)

L Cofca

.11* (. 04)

.13** (. 09)

.04 (. 07)

Dummy

.09 ( .12)

~

.89***

• 91***

.99***

• 93

.94

• 94 .

L-Livestock

R

Coeff

2

-.03

F

48.

26

26

Obs

38

19

19

DF

29

11

11

SSE

1.121

F Test of Equal of Coe£ 50 & 60
DF = 7, 22
F Test of(Dif from 1, DF=l, lJF F

*

**
***.

=

1. 7 3

Sig. Dif. from zero at the .95 level
Sig. Dif. from zero at the .90 level
Not sig. dif. from one at the 95% level

.427

.437
F =

1.09,

F =

.5

I

~

F

=

.03

.07)

., 13
coefficient s sum to one,)

Thus the aggregate production function can be

said to <lisp lay the convenient property of constant returns to scale.
However, even a sum somewhat greater than one m:i.ght bt:: expected as the depen
dent variable is gross output not value added, and in any case would not be
disturbing as there is some difficu1ty in interpretin g returns to scale in
an aggregate production functionc
The next to last line of the table represents the result of an F
test for a difference in the output elasticiti.e s in the two periods, using
the three regressions shovm.

Since the li statistlc is so low we must con

clude that the output elasticitie s are not significant ly different at the

95 percent or even 90 percent level.

·:L1er2fore it seems safe to assume

that one Cobb Douglas production functisn prevailed in the two years and
that a CES p·rod·,.,ction furction or non ,1eutraJ. technical change would not
be attractive alternative assumptions"
As shm-vn in th2 combined i-egre:rnion of '.I' able 11:;:, the estimated
output elasticitie s of tractors, t~ees, and land are significant ly positive,
while those of labor> e::.,cl irrigation are posUive Lut insignifica nt.

While

other empirical •;,Jork has usually not ~ound any st,ong :celation between
irrigation and output, the lov labor coefficient relative to the standard
error is surprising and might be attributed to errors in measurement , or to
multicollin earity) since the simple cor!:elation c.:::,efficient of land and
labor is aroeud c9,
are negativeo

Finally) the coefficient s of livestock and fertilizer

The later result, so contrary to the usual empirical evidence,

might be explained by errors in measur2ment ,

27

by the high correlation co

efficient between fertilizer and somP. of the other variables, particularl y
tractors (about , 7 in the logs), or by

2

st;rnng positive correlation

between fertilizer use and farm size, ,,ihich, if the radical I s contention
holds up, is inversely related to statewide output.
It is also possible to argue that these :selatively poor results
may be attributed to a simultaneous equation bias, due to an incorrect
assumption of independence between the mobile factors and the error term.
In other words, some states were, on the average, more productive, and his
torical½' attracted a relatively large stock of the more mobile factors.
This obviously violates the assumptions required for unbiased regression
estimates, namely that the error terms and independent variables are independent.

28

The best way to correct for this "managernenttt bias would be the
explicit introduction of factor supply functions but, as mentioned earlier,
factor price data is generally unavailable.

Another alternative is the well

known analysis of covariance approach (ACV) for dealinG with cross sectional
time series.

29

This approach involves splitting the error term into time,

state, and random components through the use of separate intercepts or
dummies for each state and each year.
Table IV presents the results of an unqualified use of the ACV
approach, including estimates of the intercepts for each state.

As can be

seen, there is a substantial increase in the coefficients of labor and live
stock.

In addition, the coefficients of coffee-caco trees and irrigation

also increase, vJhile the coefficients of land and of tractors fall.

While

management bias in the usual firm models usually leads to an overestimate
. an d
. '" no t so certain
. aggregate t h e resu 1 t ir
· tne
· · · 3 o in
or'" the e 1 asticities

would appear to depend, at least in partj on the relative factor mobilities.
Coefficients of immobile capital would appear to rise, based on the Venezuela
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TABLE IV

•
ACV

.Modified
ACV

C

(. 05)

L Tract

-.02 (. 08)

-.08**

L Frtlz

-.10* (. 02)

-.06* (. 02)

L Irrig

.07* (. 04)

.10* (. 03)

L Livestock

.23 (. 26)

.15** ( .11)

L Lab

.62* (. 27)

.30** (. 2 3)

L Land

.44* (18)

.54* (.15)

L Cofca

.39* ( .11)

.43* (. 08)

Dummy

-.01 ( .15)

-.06 ( .10)

1.63

1.38

5.8

7.2

Other

r; Coeff
F
R

,,.,oc::,-1-

•"-"'....,"'"

for

-..L,,

nt;,-1
'\"'-1
i..J-..L, .J..,J,L

n'ti'
,U,L"

2

.986

.993

F

59

71.6

Obs

38

38

DF

11

19

SSE

.112

.230

-16....
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TABLE IV (Cont.)
State Intercepts

No.

ACV

Modified
ACV

DFl]

1

-.31 (. 65)

-1.21 (. 41)

Anz

2

-1.30 (. 52)

Ar

3

-.36 (. 49)

Ba

4

-.33 (. 54)

.-.83 (. 43)

Bol

5

-.12

(. 38)

-.54 (. 32)

Car

6

-.43 (. 52)

Coj

7

.30 (. 38)

F

8

-1.51 (. 55)

G

9

-.89 , 5..,)
~

L

10

-1.45 (. 61)

Mer

11

-1.60 (. 65)

Mir

12

-1.16 (. 58)

-.26 (. 30)

~-

-1.64 (. 42)
~,
River C:+-;:i+-oc (Q ...1 .1. , ...1 Q\
-1.23 (. 37)
Anz, Mon (2, 13)
-1.55
Dry Coastal Plain (8, 10, 15)
-1.86 (. 43)

r.!,, =i V".; ,....,.....

....,'-_'-_....,

',;l'-"',1-4.J-.J..'-\J

Mon

13

-1.13 (. 56)

Port

14

-.89 (. 49)

Sucre

15

-1.60 (. 64)

Tach

16

-1.59 (. 67)

Tru

17

-1.91 (. 63)

Yar

18

-.70 (. 50)

Zulia

19

-1.14

(2. 80)

Andes (11, 16,
,;_2 . 12
Ar, Cara
-.97

\-'I

~

li}
(. 45)
(3, 6)
(. 33)

1.43 (. 93)

1] To calculate the appropriate state intercept,the figure shown should
be added to the figure for Zulia.

i7evidence, where the sum of the output elasticities of land, trees, and irri
gation increases, and in Timmer's estimation for the U.S.
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On the other

hand the coefficients of most mobile factors would appear to fall, as
shown by the decrease in the coefficients of tractors and fertilizers.
Finally, the factors with intermediate mobility··- livestock-,in the. U,. s. and
Venezuela, and as argued in the introduction, labor in Venezuela, but not
in the u.s.--would also tend to rise.

And interpreted in this way, the rise

in the Venezuelan labor coefficient indicates some immobility and holds
some promise of empirically measurable monopsony power.
All the coefficients are now significant at ,the 95 percent level
except livestock (significant at about the .G percent level) and tractors.
Fertilizer again remains significantly negative.

The estimated sum of the

coefficients is now much greater than one, and significantly different at
the • ~JS _level.

Howeve~ the sum is B.~ significantly different than 1. OG

which, as discussed above, seems reasonable when the dependent variable is
gross value of output.
While the state dummies are generally significant and the hypothesis
of a single constant is easily rejected, many of the dummies are obviously
not very different from one another.

In addition the coefficient of the

time variable, \-,hich is usually taken to be technical change, has now
shifted to (insignificantly) negative.

And, of course, the assumptions

of ACV method prohibits any test of nonneutral shifts in the production
function with data from only two periods.
As pointed out else°\vhere,

32

the ACV estimates neglect the variation

between individual and period means and use only the deviations from these
means in their estimates of the output elasticities, making them somewhat

- lL·

inefficient .

One simple method that has been suggested for improving the

ACV results along these lines is a combination 0£ some of the state dummies
based on an observed similarity of temperature , climate, rainfall, and land
f erti·1·1 ty. 33

In the Venezuelan case, it seems reasonable to argue that cer-

tain groups of states such as (1) the Venezuelan Andes (Merida, ;.: fornmy 11);
T~chira (16), and Trujillo (17)); (2)

the dry coastal states (Falcon (OG),

the states lying in the Guarico river

Lara (10), and Sucre (15)}; (3)

basin (Guarico (09), Portugesa (14) and Yaracuy (13));

the states around

Lake Vdencia (Aragua (03) and Carabobo (06)); and the eastern agricultura l
states U,nzoategui (13) and Monagas (13)) are essentially the same in terms
of long-run average fertility.

If this is true, the states in each group

would have the same intercept or dummy variable, and the same long-run
attractiven ess to mobile factors.

Observed differences viithin these groups

can then be interpreted as random disturbance s, uncorrelate d with the inde
pendent variables, increasing the efficiency of the estimates.
The results of these new regressions are also shown in Table IV.
As

is to be expected, following the previous argument, there is some decline

in the individual coefficient s, particularl y labor's output elasticity.
However all coefficient s remain different from zero at the 95 percent level
except labor (.85), and any loss in its significanc e is partially offset
by the improvement in the

11

t 11 statistic of the livestock coefficient .

Though the sum is still greater than one, it is much smaller, and not
significant ly different than L OC at the 95 percent level.

As to the state

dummies, again almost all are significant and a comparison with the first
column shows almost no loss in the explanatory po-vier, as measured by SSE
2
or in R, due to the combination of states"

In fact a test of the combined

-lS··

versus uncombined dummy hypotheses yields an F statistic of only 1.45,
showing the two approaches are essentially the same.

Finally the modified

state coefficient s seem to match our a priori conjectures about fertility
quite well, with the area around Lake Maracaibo in Zuliay the most productive,
the area around Valencia next, the Guarico basin third, and the dry coastal
states followed by the Andes, which are subject to all the difficultie s of
mountain farming, bringing up the rear.

Thus the modified ACV approach

seems to provide the most reliable estimates of the cross state aggregate
production functionc
Given the crude nature of the <lata--stock s umJeighted by prices,
or rates of service flow, imperfect estimates af the stock of labor,
etc.--it is surprisin3 that the zesults are as good as they are.

A compari

son of the results ~ith the estimates of Griliches (ACV, U.3. 1949, 54, 59)
1
Ruttan-Haya mi (3G country cross section of LDC s & DC' s 1960) and Timmer
0

•

(U.S. 1960 to 1%9), which .::1re shown in Table V; indicates a striking
similarity.

Our labor coefficient (,, 30) lies ,•iithin the r.:mge of the other

estimates, our land coefficient is somewhat high and livestock somewhat low,
but this is probably due to the difference in cove~age-cr op in Venezuela,
crop plus livestock in the others.

The coefficient of neutral technical

change is similar to the value obtained 1::y Griliches.

And although the sum

of the coefficient s is somewhat large::::- than the others, it is not unreasonabl y
greater than Griliches 2 resulto

Moreover, in the case of irrigation and

trees~-fact ors which were not treated separately or omitted due to lack
of data in the other studies--th e strong results of the Venezuela study tend
to confirm the other investigatm :-s' conjectures. .

Only in the case of

tractors and fertilizer are the results really different and this may be
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TABLE V
Griliches
ACV
1949-59·

Timmer
OLS
U.S.
1960-67

rrimmer
ACV
U.S.
1960-67

Hayami
and
Ruttan
OLS
38 Countries
1960

1.74

C

NR

L Tract-Machines

.20*

.37*

NR

.192*(.056)

L Frtlz

.11*

.15*

.05*

.161* (.053)

L Livestock

.39*

.25*

.31*

.191* (.096)

L Lab

.43*

.19*

.12*

.335* (.064)

L Land

.15*

.05*

.34*

.056 (. 065)

NR

NR

NU

.16*

.12*

Dummy

(54)-.01
(59)+.0l
,

---

Other

I: Coeff

1.28

1.17

• 94

.94* (. 035)

.98

• 97

.99

.955

2

R

Obs
DF

NR = Not Reported
NU = Not Used

117

364

364

38

71

357

301

33

. 2 J-

due to errors in measureme nt, biasing the ACV coefficie nts downward, .2s
Timmer has suggested in the explanati on of his inability to estimate the
capital coefficie nt satisfact orily.

IV.

A Test of Static Misalloca tion

Turning to the question of static efficienc y or the lack thereof,
we test the radical view of static misalloca tion against the conservat ~ve
view of economic efficienc y by an indirect method.

Let us assume constant

returns to scale, competiti ve factor use, and, for the present, homogene ity
of cultivate d land t~roughou t a state.
Under these condition s similar quantitie s of productio n factors would
be applied to the same qu-:ntity of land, regardles s of ,·1hether it was cul
tivated by small or lar3e farmers or whether it was tilled by proprieto rs,

-:is

share croppers, or tenants.~

As a result; the marginal productiv ity of

cultivate d land, whether on large or small farms and independe nt of the
tenure systems under ,-1hich it was cultivated ., would be equal.

Redistrib ution

of land from cne group of farmers to another, other inputs held constant,
would not change total statewide output.

Equation (1) essential ly assumes

that these condition s hold, as total land ,·ias "constrain ed" to have a
constant output elasticit y and therefore each type has an equal marginal
productiv ity.
An alternativ e way of arriving at the same propositi on would be to
think of each state as a large farm with its observed distribut ion of culti•
vated land between large and small farms and between the different tenure
systems.

Efficient allocatio: i by a manager uould req_uire an intra- state

allocatio n of the mobilP- inputs ~vhich ~•muld equate marginal products on the
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same quality land, whether it was part of a latifundio or a share-cropper's
or squatter's minifundia.

On the other hand, systematic misallocation by

the farm managers in each state would mean that relatively too many factors
were applied to the land on certain size farms or on farms which were operated
under one of the three tenure classifications .

Therefore, the land on

farms of that size of that tenure system would have a higher merginal product than the other types of land.
As discussed earlier, the radicals argue that the effect of the
"latifundistas" monopsony power and tenure rules is to reduce labor on the
largest farms below the competitive optimum and to squeeze the peons onto
small plots, to which, in order to keep alive, they apply too much labor.
Thus, land on the minifundia would have higher productivity, land on the
latifundia lower productivityn

And while the radicals do not extend the

argument to the intermediate size farms, presumably they too should use "too"
much labor relative to the large farms.

Since they are also regarded as

modern, employing large amounts of intermediate inputs, one might expect
that the marginal products of their cultivated land would be even greater.
On the other hand, the conservative view would imply equal marginal pro
ductivity of land on all farm sizes and tenure classifications .

In fact

it seems very likely that marginal productivity of land on the largest farms
should exceed that on the small, since it could be argued that the lati.
36
fundistas chose the best land, and use more of the modern inputs.

Our direct test of optimum allocation of labor versus misallocation
is, therefore,
H

0

oQ
oL r

>

-::,_,._

u..._.

01

s
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where

c

oC'

a

oL r

= quantity of output measured in 1957 prices

L.l. = land cultivated under tenure classific~tion i or land cultivated
on farm size i

i

= r,s and r, s refer to different tenure classifications or
farm sizes and class, "r" refers to a laru;er farm or one with
more property rights than class ns." For example, when treating
farms of different sizes, s, and r might take on values 0-100
ha and over 100 ha, class "r" always above 11 s" in size.
Hm·,ever, when comparing the prodµcti vi ty of land on farms cul•
tivated under the different tenure arrangements, r arid stake
on the values proprietor, renter, and sharecropper, squatter,
with class ilr" always referring to the group with more pro
perty rights.
Although there is obviously some overlap of size and tenure classi-

fications, we will test separately for the competitive nllocation of labor
among farms of different sizes, and among farms operated under different
tenure arrangements.
To apply this test, we need an unconstrained version of the cross
state production function of Equation (1).

He ,10uld then test whether the

assumption of the null hypothesis, i.ec constraining the aggregate produc
tion function to an equality of marginal products, si3nificantly worsens
the fit obtained ~-Jith an unconstrained production function.

We assume the form of the unconstrained
i=k
t
t
p. log xij +
2) log Qj = A. + At + I:
l.
J
i=l

production function is:
i=n
t
t
E
f.!. log X.. + u.
1.
j
l.J
i=k+l
(;

where all variables have the same interpretation as previously and the
factors uumbered k+l ton are the amounts of land in state . which are cul
J

tivated on different size farms or under different tenure arrangements.
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Using Eq. 2 we can then test the proposition that the land quality
in each size, class, or tenure is the same,

This test is simply that there

is no significant difference in the output elasticitie s of land cultivated
under different tenure arrangement s or on different size farms.

If that

hypothesis is accepted, ,-Je can then move to the test of equality of marginal
products.

Basically this test uses the CD property that the marginal p~oduct

equals the average product multiplied by the output elasticity.

Substitu

tion into the null hypothesis above and simple manipulatio n yield:

or

3]

H :b "'.>i3L/L s
r - sr
o

.Assuming equality (or H), this can be used as a constraint by substituting
the right side of 3] for~ r and comparing the resultin~ constrained form
with an unconst:rain ed form of Eq. 2. This manipulatio n can be used because
the form of Eq. 2 implies each type of land enters separately in determining
aggregate output and thus the 2-,1erage product of each type of land has the
same numerator, Q ..,
J

Further, the direction of the i.nequali ty could be determined by
assuming the ratio of the differences in marginal products is a constant
fraction, R, across states"
Then Equation 3 becomes

P

r

= R (-3 L /L

s r

s

and after substitution the test of our hypothesis becomes
H'. MP > MP
s
r o
,'\

I:-LMP <MP =~fl·
s
s
r
a

,'\

< p

s

where ,.., represents estimated values and

is estimated by regression with a new variable,
Log

X . • L ./Lsj.

rJ

rJ

Differences in land productivity could be handled in similar fashion, by
making assumptions about R based on estimated output elasticities.

V.

Results of the Test:

Venezuela

Table VI presents the results of the tests for static misallocation
described in the previous section,

In an effort to keep the presentation

manageable the estimates of the state intercepts have been omitted and only
the results for the modified ACV approach are shown.

The results of the

unmodified ACV and the 01S approaches, ,,hich are similar, are shown in the
statistical appendix, TLbles AI and All.
Col. 1 of Table VI presents a regression (unconstrained) estimate
of Eq. 2, using two types of land, land on farms over and under 100 has.

JC

Both of the estimates (.l,O and .15) are significantly positive at the 95
percent level.

A test for differences in the two elasticities, was negative,

as shown in the next column, which reports the constrained equation and the
F statistic of the constraint of equal marginal products.
DF 1, lD).

(F

= 2. i3

Thus there is no statistical difference in land quality.

In contrast, the assumption of equality of land's marginal products
is strongly rejected.

Col. 3 presents the results of a re 6 ression estimate

using Equation 3, i.e., assuming equality of marginal products and substi
tuting for one of the output elasticities.

This assumption or constraint

significantly worsens the fitted regression line, as shown by a comparison
of the standard errors of CoL 3 and CoL 1, where marginal products of land
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TABLE VI
COL. 1
Modified
ACV
Two Land
Sizes

Constrained
Equal
output
Elasticities
(. 06)

COL. 3
Constrained
Equal
Marginal
Products

COL. 4
Size of Difference in Marginc.
Products

-.12* (.07)

-.11*

(. 06)

-.08* (. 02)

-.10* (. 03)

-.08*

(. 03)

(. 04)

.12* (. 04)

L Tract

-.07

L Frtlz

-.06* (. 03)

L Irrig

.09* (. 04)

. 09*

L Livestock

. 19** ( .13)

.10 (. 11)

L Lab

.27 (. 2·6)

.45* (. 24)

. 95* (. 21)

.41** (. 24)

C Cofca.

.45* (. 09)

.42* (. 09)

.39* (. 10)

.42* (. 08)

.01 ( .12)

.27 (. 24)

.11 (. 20)

Dummy (Time)

(. 06)

COL. 2

-.15* (. 16)

L Land urrler 100 ha

.40* ( .14)

L Land Over 100 ha

.15** ( .10)

L Land < 100
L Lane! > 100

- . 09**

-.09 ( .15)

.10* (. 03)
.07 (. 14)

&

.23*

(. 09)

L Land (MP 's =)

• 04** (. 02)

L Land Under 100 ha

.47* (. 13)

L Land Over lOO•Lr/Ls

.04* (. 02)

F vs. Col. 1

=

2.13

5.80

n.a.

.984

• 982

• 979

.987

F

58

58

49

69

Obs

38

38

38

38

DI'

18

19

19

18

SSE

.254

.284

.336

.214

SER

.12

.12

.13

.11

R

2

DF

1, 18

·•27may differ but the fit is not necessarily the best.

In other words, it

would be a serious error to assume the marginal product of cultivated land
is the same on small and large farms.
Finally, Col. 4 presents estimates of the direction of the in
equality, as described by Eq. L:., where the marginal products differ by a con
stant ratio.

The estimated coefficient of land on the farms under 100 ha

(.47) is almost twelve ti~reater than the coefficient of land on large
farms (adjusted following Lr] e).

In turn this means the marginal product is

also twelve times larger, in spite of the aforementioned high correlations
between large farms and tractors, irrig~tion, and fertilizer.

It also

seems unlikely that this great difference could be explained solely by the
differences in quality shown in Col. 1; in fact, to account for this difference
at even the 95 percent significance level the land on small farms would have
.
.
39
to b e 5 times
more pro ductive.

To summarize:

Table VI shows that although land quality is roughly

the same on farms over and under 100. has., its marginal product is much
higher on smaller farms.

By our earlier argument this can only occur if

labor use on small farms is greater, for in general the larger farms tend to
use more of the other, modern inputs.

Thus the radical's monopsony power

or at least some of the market imperfections discussed in footnote 8 such
as preference for work on one's own land or non maximizing latifundistas
seem to exist.

It follows that a reduction in the unequal distribution of

land would, ceteris parabis, increase output.
cultivated would probably rise.

lmd the percentage of land

However if the simple market model

also

breaks down because of information costs, etc., which favor the large farms,
then other inputs might fall with a land reform, offsetting the ceteris

. t. (.

parabis effects.

Thus any land reforming Venezuelan government would have

to be careful to provide such inputs or risk losing any output gains.
The available evidence seems to indicate that such a policy was
attempted in Venezuela during the sixties with some success, at least as
measured by aggregate agricultural growth and competitiveness in world markets.
After passage of the Agrarian Reform Act of 19GO, the ruling party
and its peasant federation agreed to stop using land invasion as a tactic.
Instead, both groups committ2d themselves to the creation of a new class of
small family ferm owners,

It uas their intent to organize settlements (now

numbering almost 900) on purchased or public lands and within these settlements to parcelize the 12nd, c:.nd provide housing, ,1ater, market roads and
extension services.

A special compesino program ~Jas organized by the govern-

ment agricultural credit bank and modern :i..nputs such as new seeds, ferti.
an d mac h.inery
1 izers,

4o
·
· d prices.
Though the
·were supp 1.iect- at su b si· d ize

definitive study has yet to be done) the program has drawn critics who have
41 and others who suggested
suggested that it v,as too expeusive.·and toe much
that it was too little, and too extensive.

42

However, one available study

does support the results of this paper; finding that even those programs
without much investment i.n auxiliary services would raise output.

Hm-1ever,

rates of return are low if the cost of land is included, and rise when more
auxiliary services are added, lending support to the market f2.ilure approach.
Based on the above evidence one might expect rapid agricultural
growth in Venezuela during the 8arly sixties,.
can be proved, this is ex;;,ctly vhc:t did occuro

Though no causal relation
From a lagging sector in the

fifties, agriculture becmr:e a lE.ad:Lng sector in the sixties> in an economy
suffering from a slowdovm in the growth of its major export, petroleum.

l+L•.

·

43

-29-

Productio n also seemed to increase in internati onal competiti veness, as
non-trad itional agricultu ral exports grevi at nearly double the rate of the
economy during the period 1961 to 1966.

Compared ,d-th other major Latin

American countries , the overall performan ce is even mo:re striking; only
Venezuela and Mexico were able to increase per capita food output during the
sixties.

45

Finally, the results of this paper would also suggest that once

the static reallocat ion effects were achieved, agricultu ral growth would slow
down without continued investmen t or technical p".."ogress.

Again the aggregate

evidence is consisten t constant, showing some slo,-;ing of the agricultu ral
.

.

growth rate in the late s1.xt1.es,

l:-6

though again no causal relation or proof

of the hypothesi s can be claimed.
Turning to the test of differenc es between the productiv ity of tenure
classes, we first comp~re the output elasticit ies of land cultivate d by pro
prietors, renters •sharecro ppers, and squatters using the methods described by
0

Eqs. 2, 3, and 4.

Since data from 1950 on the distribut ion of cultivate d

land by tenure classes were unavailab le, only the OLS method could be used.
The results for regressio ns using the three classes are presented in
Table VII 7 however; there ,·,as little or no differenc e ,vhen the compariso ns
i-1ere made between owners and non owners.

As might be expected, given the

paucity of observati ons and the difficult y with OLS, the results are much
poorer than those by farm size~

Although land cultivate d by squatters has

the highest output elasticit y, there vJas no significa nt differenc e between
the three coefficie nts.

Further there was also no significa nt differenc e

betvJeen the three marginal products, imp lying that any breakdown in markets
should not be attribute d to the t2nure structure .

Thus the results of this

TABLE.VII
COL. 1

COL. 2

OLS

OLS

3 Tenure
Classes
7~12*

C

(1.13)

Equal Output
Elasticities

OLS
Equal Marginal
Products

7. 44

(. 90)

12

(.09)

.23*

(.07)

-. 05*

(. 08)

L Tn1ct

.09 (.09)

.09

L Frtlz

.11**

• 11**

(.08)

COL. 3

(. 08)

L Irrig

- • 04 (. 06)

- • 07

(. 06)

·-.06

(.06)

L Livestock

- .12 ( .12)

- • 06

(. l(?}

-.17

(.11)

.57** (34)

L Lab
C Cofca

.03

L Prop

.10 ( .17)

L Rent, SC

.11**

LSQT

.24* (.12)

(.07)

2

~13

(.20)
.
.'

(.05)

.17* (. 07)
(.MP Is =)

F vs. Col. 1

R

-.01 (.06)

.97*

(.08)

I:LLD
L Land

.51* (.23)

-.0035* {.0020)

DF = 2, 9

.72

1.96

•.963

.956

.945

F

26

34

27

Obs

19

19

19

DF

9

11

11

.284

.331

.410

SSE

. 3:i.-

paper are in accord with the work of CheungJ who demonstrates that no static
misallocation will arise from competitively determined sharecropping arrangements.

47

The crucial breakdo·wn in markets would seem to be the result of

the large farm-small farm structure, rather than the tenure structure.
This conclusion is also supported by an alternative analysis.
Cheung finds static efficiency and would use differences in crop risks and
transactions costs to explain differences in the percentage of sharecropped
land.

More recently Bardhan and Srinivasan have pointed out that Cheung

neglects tenant maximization and when this is introduced there vJill be some
48
.
. 11 ocat1.onr
ml.Sa

They then show that parametric shifts in the wage would

increase the percentage of land shar2cropped; as would land augmenting
innovation"

49

The authors confirm these results ,vi.th tests on Indian data •

.Applying the Bardhan-Srinivasan test to Venezuelan statewide data

50

we obtain the following regression, similar to that used in their original
article:
Log PCT Share Cropped= .35 - 2.94 Log Wage+ .58 Log Irrigation

SE

(5. 3)

(2. 00)

(. 2 9)

DF = 15
R2 .= .30.
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The low coefficient of determination is roughly the same as those
in the original article and irrigation's coefficient is significant, with
the correct sign.

However, the coefficient of the wage has the wrong sign

and is not significantly different from zero~
One exp).anation for this poor result ,vould seem to be the treatment
of the wage as parametric.

If differences in wages are mainly the result

of neutral technological differences :Ln a 6riculture; for example, then the

J

-32-

sign of the wage coefficient may be negative.
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Alternatively, if low wages

are the result of monopsony power in a state, .due to uneven distribution of
land, we would expect that

a) the coefficient of the Gini variable would

be negative as the monop sonist \~ould tend to offer fewer leases and
b) the negative correlation between the Gini coefficient and the wage rate
Following Bardhan and

would tend to increase the coefficient of wages.

Srinivasan we introduce the Gini coefficient and obtain:
Log PCT sharecropped= -6,96 + .33 Log Wage+ .40** Log Irrigation
(SE)

(. 22,)

(5.96) (2.4)

DF = 14

- lLi-, 17* Gini.

2
R = .47

(6. 56)

The only significant coefficient (at the 95 percent level) is associated
with the Gini and it has the expected negative sign.

Although it robs the

other coefficients of significance, it does change the sign of the wage co
efficient.

These results seem to confirm the previous analysis; that the

distribution of land is the crucial variable in any analysis of misalloca
tion and market failure in rural Venezuela, not the tenure structure.

VI.

Summary and Conclusions
This paper advances and tests three basic hypotheses about agricul

tural structure and agricultural output--conserv ative, radical, and market
failure due to information costs, risks, etc~

The radical view suggests

that emphasis should be placed on sharecropping and monopsony power as
methods of exploitation vihich, incidently, lead to a misallocation of labor
toward the smaller farms and a loss of aggregate output.
phenomena tvhich would support this vie,;.: would be

2

The empirical

significant difference

a) small and large farms, and

between the marginal products of land on
b)

proprietor operated vso

sharecropper-occupant operated farms.

To

correct these deficiencies and increase agricultur2l output the radical
would advocate a breakup of the large estates and restrictions on rental
contracts, such as now exist in the Brazil ond Colombia"
By contrast, the conservative ,1ould argue that large farmers are
better farmers 2nd their land is more productive because they are more perceptive, react more quickly, and use more inputs.

Tne empirical implication

of this view is that marginal productivities of ~and should be greater on
large farms, with the. cor espond::.ng policy i_mplication that a land reform
would reduce total ag:r.icul tm. al ('utput.
Finally, the rnicldJ.e iie ;.1-•• b.ssed
1

1

analysis-- suggests tha.'.. a varie~:y cf

:Jn

the inadequacy of simple market

e:: emcntE,

such c1s preference for work

on ones 1 own lar.d._, utility :rathc::r than pr0fit max:i.mizing landlords, differences
in risks, and information; woulci ledd to differences in input proportions

on small and large farms"

1>JhLle this -vie,v car,~ies no presumption toward

the relative sizes of J.and 1 s margir.a}. produce:) only the first two of the

cited elements would lead to a difference

large farms.

If this element dominates and assuming small farmers cultivate a greater
percentage of their land_, then Agrarian reform would still tend to increase
agricultural output" althm1gh the go 11ernmen-:: might be forced to take some
action to prevent other inputs from falling.
As a preliminary tc a test of the validity of these hypotheses

about marginal products: an aggregate Cobb Douglas Production Function was
estimated by OLS and ACV, using Venezuelan state inputs and outputs as the
variableso

Venezuela was used because i_ts land structure and slow growth

of agricultural output seetr,eci quit2 represe;:n:ative of Latin AmeLica during
the fifties J whi.J.e i tJ dat.:: ceer:i.ed ,.·elatively good"
The most reasonable estimates of the output elasticities were ob
tained by using a mor.:cifir=d iiCV ~.::,prc;ach.,
quite reasonable in terms of
• 95J

The results of this estimation ,.,ere

a) signific:mc'; levels of coefficients over

b) similarity ot estirr.ate:s tc, other -c.-,:.:,-rk (Gri.liches) Hayarni··RuttanJ

Timmer),

c) a pr:i.ori ,:onjcctt.::;:·eo :cegarc.i:ig i:hr, r~,:~ative productivity of

groups of stal~'"s e. g,. th(: .:'1ndeo (low), I.-~,tw l1a\:acaibo :.:eg5.,:,r, (highest),
Lake Valenci~ r~gion (vs~; ~igh).

rural cap:U:al ctod:~

that equality

r,-F

1,-:: :gf ·.,.c",.:. p,.oducts i-Jou1d j_mp 3.y ::!quaJ.i ty b8t:wecn one output

elasticity and ;:-hQ otL2 ..·.
constraint showea

~h1~

Lll

•,L1~·.!.pli::r1 by t'..:,' ,;.1t:io of tl-.~ two inputs.
the marginal vrociuct:s of land

farms were c::;,J2nti 1:.ly, d~:'~:f:2:,~r.~'..

r•'

0n

This

small and large

the ,il-'.,cg11:.aJ.. p::oducts of J.and operated

by proprietors_, :;:-r:::1·::2:~·r. 2n,~ :;hc:·;_·.:c,:;:;.·c;:;p,::.. :.; and c;ciuat,.:e:.:·s o:::- owners and non-

This second result--supporting Cheung 1 s contention that different
tenure patterns are not evidence of rnisallcer.ition, and that the important
variable is the distribution of ownership--was confirmed by regression
analysis of the percentage of land sharecropped along the lines suggested
by Bardhan·· Srinivasano

Only the Gini coefficient of land distribution had

significant explanatory power and it seemed to be inversely related to
the wage as well as the percentage sharecropped, as would be expected.
Finally, a regression ~as estimated with the small farm, large farm
data vlhich allowed the mar::_:;inal 'Hoc'.ucts of land to differ from each other
by a constant factor"

This :cegressLm showed that cultivated land on large

farms was roughly , 08 as productive as land on small farms with an upper
bound of .20.

Since the ratio of output elasticities--one estimate of re

lative quali ties·--.,was only , 3/, tr.is means that the ob served differences in
marginal products could not be explained. by dL':ff~rences in land quality.
These empiricc.11 ,:·esults would tend to provide support for the radical I s
call for .Agrarian Reform, though they would also suggest that tenure arrange•
ments should probably continue to be left to the market.

Finally, since the

larger farms do seem to be ass,:,cinted with greater use of modern inputs, any
agrarian reform legislati.on should include provisions to improve the distri
bution of these inpets and the associated modern techniqueso

Some attempt

was made to carry out such a land reform in Venezuela during the sixties and
the aggregate data support the results of this paper; though they obviously
are only correlated ,·Jith the land 1·efo1·m and c2nnot be shown to have been
caused by it"

Irr.mediately following t;he land :reforrn 7 .sgriculture became a

leading sector and inc:reaseci i.:u :;_ni::ernat:LonaJ. competi ti.veness.

However,
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as might be expected from a single improvement in static efficiency, the
growth rate of agriculture declined by the end of the decade.

To maintain

the high growth rate, continued investment and continued technical improve
ment will be necessary.
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price fluctuation would seem to dampen the first two motives and m1rt1mum
wage laws have not been enforced in rural areas;. (See footnote 2). On the
other hand, if there were no monopsony power and factors 3 - 5 were impor
tant, it still would mean that a redistribution of land would raise agricul
tural output.
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tural investment.
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See CIDA [1965, 1966].

15 Calculated from the original sources cited in T2ble 1.. The Gini
coefficient is equal to the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and
0
the 45o line of equality and the area under the l:.s line. See Morgan [ 1%2] ~
The method used was an approximation: G = 1 k
I: (f •+-1 f •) (y • + y • 1)

i=l

I

1

1

1

1,

where G = Gini coefficient, fi = cumulative frequency of farms in class i,
Yi= cumulative frequency of land in class i. The coefficient is an arith
metic summary of conc.entration. However it is some·what insensitive to
small percentage change in distribution favorini the lower groups and under
states any movement toward equality. See Garvey [ 1S'51].
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see CID.A (1065, 1966].
see Nerlove [1S67]~

See Nerlove [ 1%5]. Nerlove suggests one way out is the assumption
that firms minimize costs, but this seems unreasonable for farms. Also
data on factor prices, which are required, is unavailable.

-39ic·
;.,Hoch [ 1962] follows the procedure outlined here but neglects the
problem of estimating marginal products through the use of the (assumed)
random dependent variable. See Carter & Hartley [ 195[], and Fisk [ 1966).
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This approach has been used on Brazilian data by Cline [1970].
Sample survey data on farms are used to demonstrate static misallocati on in
the sense of (a) amount of land left idle on large farms., and (b) declining
value of net input per unit of land, valued at market prices, as farm size
increases, in spite of the fact that cross sectionally there appears to be
no relation between farm size and the CD constant. Lau and Yotopolous [1971]
have used a profit function, rather than a production function, to demon
strate the relatively greater productivit y of small iarms. However, their
profit calculation s requires not only output but input value, data which are
unavailable in Venezuela.
21

This approach has been used by Griliches [ 1%3a, 1963b, 19M.] •
.Although there is obviously some bias due to the aggregation , little work
has been done on estimating its nature and direction.
22

Nerlove [ 1%5] emphasizes the importance and meaning of this assump
tion for production functions estimated from cross sectional firm data.
However, little work has been done on aggregate production functions.
1965] ::md Yotopolous [1967] convert stocks

to flows.
24
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see Hoch [l'JG2], Zellner) etc al. [1%0],
see BCV, J_n~ Econ6mico 196!{-,

26

Apure is ci llanos or plains state which contains much of the country's
cattle ranching and i3 subject to large annual flooding, Nueva Esparta is
an island state, and the Federal Territories are mainly undeveloped lands
in the jungle or on the Orinoco River Delta. Since 1963 the Territory
Delta Amacuro has been agricultura lly developed to reduce food shortages
in the nearby, rapidly grm·1ing Cuidad Guayana.
27 Th

e f"igures are rrl ows o f metric
. tons or.c c h em1.ca
' 1 f er t 1.· 1 1.zer.
·
Th ey
are unweighted by quality and neglect organic fertilizer completely.
Moreover they do not include the intensity of fertilizer used in the state.
The difference between organic and chemical may have confused some farmers,
particularl y in 1950, ·ohen illiteracy was high. Finally there may be a
timing problem in the reporting, since the inputs are the amounts used in
the crop year and since farmers may have reported the flow amounts employed
for the harvest of 1951, rather than 1950.
2

CNerlove [l~G5].
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_;Hoch [ 1962], rfondlak [ L61].
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see Hoch [19G2] and Nerlove [1965],
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31
32

see Timmer [1971],

'l'immer 1 s results are presented in Table V.

Maddala [1971], Nerlov~ [1971a], Nerlcve [1971b].
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see for example the rainfall and topographical maps of Venezuela.
1%Jb, 1965] has used this approach.

IBRD (1961], Griliches [1S63 8 ,

34

See Timmer [1971], pp. 736··707.

35

see Cheung [1969]. Bardhan and Srinivasan [1971] argue that there
is some difference in the use of i.nputs on land operated under sharecropping
and other forms of tenurec
36

For example, Logarithmic Regressions which explain fertilizer,
irrigation, and tractors by the amount of cultivated land on different size
farms show that the elasticity with respect to the farms over 100 ha is
generally significantly different th&n zero and larger than one. The other
elnsticities, no matter what combinations are used, are generally insignificant.
37

While this fo:.:-m does have the useful property that differences in
quality can be observed it has two defe~ts. First, it does not aggregate
arithmetically to the form of Equation }. if the null hypothesis is satisfied
and second, the i.and variables are treated as agg:cegc1te complements, rather
than aggregate competitors for mobile factors, unless i:-1e also impose the
constraint that land area is fixed" However, in that case, output would
rise only by swi tchi.ng Lmd from one group to the other, which turns out
to be basically what we are testing·•·· the average and marginal productivity
of different classes of land,
38

Any division of by farm sizes is arbitrary, since the farms at the
upper end of each class ~,.10uld probably most resemble those of the next class.
To prevent introducing any :curther collinearity into the regression because
of this bunching., a matrix of the simple correlation coefficients for the
land in farm classer; 0-5, 5-20, 20··100: ove,: 100 has., was calculated. Then
those classes with the largest correlBtion coefficients, 0-5, 5-20, 20-100
(rou3hly .9 between the second two and 075 between the first and the sum of
the other two separately) ,-Jere then combined since there seemed to be a
sharp break between these three classes and the fourth) where the correla
tion was about .2, .3, and .5, respectively.
39Thi· s f.
. obtained by calculating a 95 confidence interval
i gu.re is

for the value of 11 R11 in Equation 4 ,vhich would just equalize the marginal
products. To form thic interval various values of R ,·Jere tried in the
equality:
4:,and over 100/Land under 100,}
under 100
which was then used to :i-eplace ~ over 100 in Equ2tion l:. Thus the value
of R = 1/12 or a p:::-oductivit:y twelve times greater on small farms would
certainly equate the two marginal p~oducts. In fact values down to R = 1/5
fall into the 95 percent confidence intsrval around 1/12. If Col. 1 rather

than Col. 4 is taken to be the unconstrainea equation) then a value of
R = 1/3 would still fall cutside the :cange (95 percent confidence interval)
in ·which marginal products of Col. lf are equal.,
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· see Powell [ 1971],

In addition the Ac don Democratica government
continued the program of major irrigation works and provided a great many
wells to small m~r2rs.
See MAC, ]~distica~ A g r ~ ~ - Finally,
the price of chemical fertilizer from the gcvernment run IVP was kept arti
fically low and constant until 1966. See BCV Informe Econ6mico, various
years. Price supports have also been used for campesino crops and many
storage silos were built.
lfl

See for example:

Coutsmaris and Bosz [1963], IBRD [1961].

42 For example, Jasperson [ 1969 ] , suggests consolidation and concentration of the propram is needed. See also Warriner [1969].
4,3

Jasperson [196S]o

44- See Heaton [lSGS]
Econ6mico 1969,
45

usDA, Indir:es o_t1\grt.£2ltura1.,Production

for

the Western Hemisphere,

May, 1%9.

l,.8
· Bardhan and Srinivasan [ 1971],
19
' • R1.sing
· ·

1
wages ,-Jou ld reduce deman d. f or 1 anct' 1oy s1arecroppers
at every
rental rate, but it would also increase the supply, since landlords would
find that working the 1-:Jnd 1'Jith hired help was more expensive.
Since
both demand and supply (taking into account the amount of effort which the
sharecroppers devote to land) are d~asing fu.nctio11s of t11e rental rate.,
with
D' > S 1 ; the equilibriu;n fraction of land which is offered rises.
Irrigation can be thought of as a land augmenting innovation 'tvhich raises
the amount of land held by landlords, thereby raising the supply of leases
at every rental rate.

SOA wage was calculated by multiplying the cl2ss midpoints of the
agricultural incomes reported in DGE, Novene Censo de Poblacion and the class
frequency. The land vari2ble was the percentage of total land operated by
sharecroppers, rather than the cultivated i.and variable us1=d elsewhere in
the paper. Since the B&:cdhan-Srinivasan model would lead to a corner solu
tion, ·which would prevent the existence of either fixed price rental or
sharecropping, regressions were also run usin3 the percentage of total land
opM"ated by renters.
In terms of sizes and significance levels of coefficients
the results were qualitatively similar,

-42-

51The reported re;:;ression represents the nbest" form in terms of
2
the R statistic,
52

Bardhan and Srinivasan [ 1971] suggest that neutral technical change
will de-crease the percentage of land which is sharecropped, but treat the
real wage as a parameter. See footnote 50.
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APPENDIX TABLE AI

ACV
Different
Elasticities
L 'I'ract
L

.02

Frtlz

-.07*

L rrrig

ACV
Constrained
Equal
Elasticities

(.08)

(.03)

.03

(.09)

-.10*(.03)

·.07**(.-40)

.09*

ACV
Constrained
Equal
Marginal,
Products

Marg in:d.
ProducU:

. 06

-.01 (.09)

(. 11)

-.11*

(.04)

.11*

(. 04)

(.04)

JI.CV

Diffcrcn t

-.08*

(.03)

. 07** (. 0-1)

L Livestock

.24 (.27)

.28

L Lab

.58*

(.29)

• 72*

(.32)

.95*

(.29)

.59*

L Cofca

.43*

(.17)

.36*

(.13)

.37*

(.14)

.41* (.11)

DU111.tt1y

(Time)

- • 26 _(. 20)

(.30)

-.02

(.19)

.13

(.10)

.32

(.33)

.01

(.32)

.01

(.03)

.22

(.27)
(.27)

-.13

(.27)

L Land Under 100 ha

• 45

(. 17)

L Land Over l00·Lr/Ls

.01 (.02)

L Land Under 100 ha

.43*

L Land ·over 100 ha

.02

(.17)
(.11)

r; L Land

EL Land, .MP=

F vs. Col. 1 DF
R2

= 1, 10

4~.17

• 993

6.00*

.990

.994

.989

F

56

43

38

56

Obs

38

38

38

38

DF

10

11

11

11

SSE

.108

.153

.173

.104

SER

.10

.12

.13

.10

•

.;,

APPENDIX TABLE AII

OLS

OLS

Cons~r2ined
?•~argi.:,al

I)i::ferer1t
!-~a rg i.na l.

?z:-oducts

P.::oducts

OLS

Elasticities

Co:?strai.ned
E~ual
Elas-t:icities

8.25* (. 73)

7.60*(.73)

7.95*(.94)

7. 79* (. 78)

L Tract

.12* (-.05)

.13* (. 05)

.19* (.05)

• 10* (. 05)

L Frtlz

-.05**(.04)

OLS
Different

Constant

L Irrig

• 04 (. 05)

L Livestock

-.13**(.07)

L Lab
Cofca

L

Du,_--:-z.y
L

{Tin:;.e)

-.06**(.03)

-.Ol(.05)

.03(.06)

• 04 (. 05)

-.08 (.08}

- .1.0 (. 09)

-.10(.08)

.25(.24)

.72*(.l7)

.12 (. 21)

.1.0* (. 04)

.14* (. 04)

.16*(.05)

.10* (. 04)

-.13**(.08)
.51* (. l4)

Land.

• 08 { .14)

l00 c1a

-.05(.04)

.21(.23)

Lar..d Under 100 ha

L

-.09*(.03)

• 11 ( .15}

.

Land

-.1.6

( .17}

.28*(.ll}

:EL La:;.d MP's

=

·• Ol {. 02)

L Land under 100 ha
La~d Over 100-Lr/Ls

L

F vs. Col.
_c-.

R

.68*(.18)

1 DF

=

.03*(.02}

1,28

5.63*

2

.928

ll.9*

.9129

.897

.932

F

40

38

32

43

Obs

38

38

38

38

DP

28

29

29

28

SSE

1.148

1.381

l.635

l.072

SER

.20

.22

.24

.20

